University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Social Sciences - Papers

Faculty of Social Sciences

1-1-2017

Reinterpretation in visual imagery is possible without visual cues:
a validation of previous research
Kevin Kamermans
Erasmus University of Rotterdam

Wim T. J. L Pouw
Erasmus University of Rotterdam, University of Connecticut, pouw@fsw.eur.nl

Fred Mast
University of Bern

Fred Paas
Erasmus University of Rotterdam, University of Wollongong, fredp@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/sspapers
Part of the Education Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Kamermans, Kevin; Pouw, Wim T. J. L; Mast, Fred; and Paas, Fred, "Reinterpretation in visual imagery is
possible without visual cues: a validation of previous research" (2017). Faculty of Social Sciences Papers. 3349.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/sspapers/3349

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Reinterpretation in visual imagery is possible without visual cues: a validation of
previous research
Abstract
Is visual reinterpretation of bistable figures (e.g., duck/rabbit figure) in visual imagery possible? Current
consensus suggests that it is in principle possible because of converging evidence of quasi-pictorial
functioning of visual imagery. Yet, studies that have directly tested and found evidence for reinterpretation
in visual imagery, allow for the possibility that reinterpretation was already achieved during memorization
of the figure(s). One study resolved this issue, providing evidence for reinterpretation in visual imagery
(Mast and Kosslyn, Cognition 86:57-70, 2002). However, participants in that study performed
reinterpretations with aid of visual cues. Hence, reinterpretation was not performed with mental imagery
alone. Therefore, in this study we assessed the possibility of reinterpretation without visual support. We
further explored the possible role of haptic cues to assess the multimodal nature of mental imagery. Fiftythree participants were consecutively presented three to be remembered bistable 2-D figures
(reinterpretable when rotated 180°), two of which were visually inspected and one was explored hapticly.
After memorization of the figures, a visually bistable exemplar figure was presented to ensure
understanding of the concept of visual bistability. During recall, 11 participants (out of 36; 30.6%) who did
not spot bistability during memorization successfully performed reinterpretations when instructed to
mentally rotate their visual image, but additional haptic cues during mental imagery did not inflate
reinterpretation ability. This study validates previous findings that reinterpretation in visual imagery is
possible.
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Abstract
Is visual reinterpretation of bistable figures (e.g., duck/rabbit figure) in visual imagery possible? Current consensus suggests
that it is in principle possible because of converging evidence of quasi-pictorial functioning of visual imagery. Yet, studies that
have directly tested and found evidence for reinterpretation in visual imagery, allow for the possibility that reinterpretation
was already achieved during memorization of the figure(s). One study resolved this issue, providing evidence for reinterpretation in visual imagery (Mast and Kosslyn, Cognition 86:57–70, 2002). However, participants in that study performed
reinterpretations with aid of visual cues. Hence, reinterpretation was not performed with mental imagery alone. Therefore,
in this study we assessed the possibility of reinterpretation without visual support. We further explored the possible role of
haptic cues to assess the multimodal nature of mental imagery. Fifty-three participants were consecutively presented three
to be remembered bistable 2-D figures (reinterpretable when rotated 180°), two of which were visually inspected and one
was explored hapticly. After memorization of the figures, a visually bistable exemplar figure was presented to ensure understanding of the concept of visual bistability. During recall, 11 participants (out of 36; 30.6%) who did not spot bistability
during memorization successfully performed reinterpretations when instructed to mentally rotate their visual image, but
additional haptic cues during mental imagery did not inflate reinterpretation ability. This study validates previous findings
that reinterpretation in visual imagery is possible.
Keywords Visual imagery · Visual bistability · Haptic perception · Mental rotation · Imagery Debate
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Although visual imagery is phenomenally familiar to most
individuals, its psychological nature remains elusive. One
of the central questions in what was dubbed “The Imagery
Debate” concerns the structural resemblance between visual imagery and visual perception (Block 1981; Kosslyn
1994; Pylyshyn 2002; Tye 2000). On the one hand, it was
argued that visual imagery operates on amodal propositional
encodings that are transduced from perception and, therefore, functionally independent from (ongoing) constraints
of visual perception (Pylyshyn 2002). On the other hand,
it was shown that typical constraints of visual perception
remain present in imagery (e.g., Shepard and Metzler
1971), which fueled the idea that visual imagery shares
common mechanisms with visual perception. Although,
there is still much discussion about the degree of resemblance between perception and imagery (e.g., Foglia and
O’Regan 2015; Pearson and Kosslyn 2015), and the role of
top-down amodal processes (e.g., Langland-Hassan 2015),
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there is a general consensus that imagery does not (only or
necessarily) operate on amodal propositional encodings as
was proposed by one of the main contenders of the classic
imagery debate (Pylyshyn 2002). This consensus has been
reached, in part, through behavioral evidence that suggests
that visual imagery functions like visual perception (Kosslyn 1973; Shepard and Metzler 1971) in conjunction with
neuroscientific evidence for iconic resemblance in neural
organizations associated with visual perception (i.e., retinotopic representations; for an overview see Pearson and
Kosslyn 2015).
Research that fueled the consensus that visual imagery
does not only function on symbolic re-descriptions of visual
information, is concerned with the possibility of reinterpretation of visually bistable figures (e.g., duck/rabbit figure
by Jastrow 1899, p. 312) in visual imagery. Recent studies have argued that this is indeed possible (e.g., Peterson
1993; Mast and Kosslyn 2002), in contrast to a descriptivist
account of visual imagery which argued for its impossibility (Pylyshyn 2002). However, due to some methodological loose ends there is a need for more empirical research
to further buttress reinterpretability in visual imagery. This
study aims to provide a validation of previous findings that
is currently missing, but necessary as to reach such empirical
consensus. Furthermore, we aim to assess whether crossmodal information via haptic perception can support visual
imagery processes.

Reinterpretation in visual imagery
Bistable figures have two interpretations (e.g., duck/rabbit
figure; Jastrow 1900; Jensen and Mathewson 2011; Mitroff,
Sobel, & Gopnik, 2006). Reinterpreting a bistable figure
in visual perception involves attaining a new percept (e.g.,
rabbit) that visually dominates over the initial percept (e.g.,
duck) of an object. Attaining a new percept can be achieved
through visual reinspection of the figure that fosters detection of relevant spatial correspondences between figure and
an alternate novel interpretation. The common approach
for testing reinterpretation in visual imagery is to assess
whether an object Z (e.g., duck/rabbit figure) that is visually
perceived as an X (e.g., rabbit) can be reinterpreted when
recalled from memory in visual imagery as being a Y (e.g.,
duck). In other words, spatial correspondences between the
imagined figure and its novel interpretation are detected in
visual imagery.
Early phenomenological characterizations of visual
imagery held that visual reinterpretation cannot be a general feature of imagery, since images are typically created by
the imaginer (Sartre 1940; see also Dalla Barba, Rosenthal,
& Visetti, 2002). Thus, discovery of a novel interpretation
is unlikely since a self-invoked visual image is bound to
the interpretation it was given when generating the image
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intentionally (Chambers and Reisberg 1985). If this is correct, visual imagery functions in a sense like descriptions,
in that the content of visual images is tied to a mode of
presentation transferred from one’s intentions (LanglandHassan 2015). As such, the functioning of visual images
goes beyond the sensory image itself; they have a frame of
reference (Chambers and Reisberg 1985), and are “images
under a description” (Fodor 1975, p. 190l). Thus, on this
descriptive view of visual images, it is predicted that discovery of novel interpretations of images in visual imagery
(i.e., reinterpretation) is not possible (Chambers and Reisberg 1985; Pylyshyn 2002; Fodor 1975).
If reinterpretation is possible, it would support a core idea
of the Quasi-pictorial Account of visual imagery (Kosslyn,
Thompson, & Ganis, 2006). One of its core ideas is that
visual imagery functions like visually perceiving pictures
(e.g., drawings, diagrams). Pictures do not have a fixed
meaning—their meaning is dependent (amongst others)
on an interpreter detecting relevant correspondences with
other objects (Kulvicki 2014). Analogously, visual images
may be like pictures, such that visual images preserve and
bring forth the spatial properties of a memorized object (Z),
without fixing the meaning that was initially assigned to the
object (e.g., Z as X). Therefore, the quasi-pictorial account
predicts that visual imagery would allow for detection of
novel meanings in mental images.
It has to be noted that the possibility of reinterpretation
in visual imagery does not necessarily support all core ideas
of the quasi-pictorial account (e.g., Thompson 2007), nor do
we think it is necessarily the only account that is in par with
it (e.g., Langland-Hassan 2015; Thomas 1999).1 Rather,
the possibility of reinterpretation would indicate that visual
imagery does not necessarily function as descriptions, and
allow for perceptual acts similar to pictorial representations.

Empirical evidence for reinterpretation in visual
imagery
Is reinterpretation in visual imagery possible? The first landmark study by Chambers and Reisberg (1985) suggested a
negative answer. In their study, participants were first familiarized with bistable figures with several examples. Subsequently, participants were shown a novel figure; the classic

1

For example, reinterpretation is not directly concerned with
whether visual images are experienced as pictures (Thompson 2007).
Nor is the question concerned with whether visual images are literally
encoded in a visual format (e.g., retinotopic neural representations;
e.g., Slotnick et al. 2005), or also co-constituted by bodily re-experiences such as eye-movements (Thomas 1999; Foglia and O’Regan
2015). Nor does the possibility of reinterpretation suggest that topdown propositional processing plays no role in functioning of mental
imagery (Langland-Hassan 2015).
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duck/rabbit figure (Jastrow 1899). This duck/rabbit figure
was presented briefly (i.e., 5 s) as to ensure that participants
perceived only one interpretation instead of both. Results
showed that none of the participants could reinterpret the
figure in their visual imagery when told that it was bistable.
In contrast, all participants detected the novel interpretation
when drawing out their mental image on paper, suggesting
that the failure to detect bistability in visual imagery was not
due to poor memorization of the figure.
Finke, Pinker, and Farah (1989) expanded on previous
findings by demonstrating that novel interpretations can be
made in visual imagery by combining visually simple and
highly familiar objects. Subjects were asked to imagine the
capital letter D turned 90 degrees to the left and resting on
top of the capital letter J, upon which they were able to see an
umbrella in this new construal. Subsequent studies including more complex figures like the duck/rabbit figure showed
that such figures are in fact reinterpretable in imagery (i.e.,
Brandimonte and Gerbino 1993; Chambers and Reisberg
1991; Hyman and Neisser 1991; Peterson, Kihlstrom, Rose,
& Glisky, 1992). One of these studies using the duck/rabbit
figure found that 40% of participants were capable of detecting the alternate interpretation in visual imagery (Peterson
et al. 1992).
To make sense of the inconclusive findings on reinterpretation in visual imagery, Peterson and colleagues (1992)
argued that the outcome of these studies depends on how
congruent the bistable figure example is with respect to the
test figure(s). That is, the example figure that is being used
to familiarize participants with visual bistability needs to be
reversed in a manner that is similar to the test figure(s) for
reinterpretation to occur. This would explain the null-findings of Chambers and Reisberg (1985) who used bistability
examples that required different reorientations than the duck/
rabbit test figure to detect reversal (e.g., down-up reversal vs.
front-to-back reversal). Other studies resolved this problem
using more congruent bistability examples that required the
same reversal strategies as the test figure, indeed leading
to improved reinterpretation (Brandimonte and Gerbino
1993; Hyman and Neisser 1991; Peterson et al. 1992). With
regards to the positive findings of Finke and colleagues,
test stimuli involved very simple and highly memorized
stimuli (i.e., alphabetic letters; symbolic representation) that
do not directly compare to having to interpret and reinterpret
iconic representations through visual imagery.
However, as identified by Mast and Kosslyn (2002), there
is a methodological issue in all previous studies that preclude inferences about the possibility of reinterpretation in
visual imagery. In the previous studies, example bistable figures are consistently demonstrated before participants have
to memorize the test figures (e.g., Peterson et al. 1992). This
could have possibly alerted participants about the presence
of bistability in the upcoming test figures that they had to
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Fig. 1  Bistable figure (a) and corresponding fragmented visual cues
(b) as used in Mast and Kosslyn (2002). The young lady/old woman
(a) was also used as an example bistable figure in the current study

memorize. Indeed, Slezak (1991) has found that participants
who were familiar with figure bistability before memorization of a second figure were able to detect bistability, but
they were not able to do so for the first presented figure
which was not preceded by a cue about bistability. In sum,
providing a bistability example before test figures are presented renders it problematic to conclude whether participants attained the novel interpretation in their visual imagery
or inadvertently already noticed (or were predisposed to be
sensitive to) the bistability while perceiving the figure.
Mast and Kosslyn (2002) evaded the previous methodological issue by not familiarizing participants with bistability. Instead, participants had to memorize the picture of the
old woman/young lady depicted in Fig. 1. Bistability is hard
to detect because the picture has to be rotated upside down
to discover the second interpretation.
This was done by instructing participants to repeatedly
draw the picture until they could draw it correctly from
memory. Once memorized, participants were instructed
to rotate their mental image upside down with the aid of
fragmented visual cues from the original stimulus (also see
Fig. 1). These visual cues were added as support during
mental rotation because of the relatively complex nature
of the old woman/young lady compared to previously used
bistable figures (e.g., duck/rabbit). A total of 16 participants
(out of 36 participants who did not discover bistability during memorization) were able to detect bistability in visual
imagery combined with visual cues (i.e., fragmented version of Fig. 1). Importantly, additional participants were
assigned to a separate control condition in which only the
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fragmented picture was presented. These participants did
not perform above chance level when asked to choose from
a list of possible interpretations. This finding excluded the
possibility that being provided with the fragmented picture
was sufficient for discovering the correct interpretation, suggesting that visual imagery played some functional role in
reinterpretation with visual cues.
However, even though visual cues may not have been a
sufficient condition for detecting a novel interpretation, it is
possible that providing raw visual information directly is a
necessary condition for making reinterpretation via visual
imagery possible. Since it cannot be excluded that visual
cues were a necessary condition for visual reinterpretation
in Mast and Kosslyn’s (2002) study, it is possible that the
descriptivist claim that visual imagery alone does not allow
for inspection of the raw sensory image still holds true
(Chambers and Reisberg 1985; Fodor 1975; Pylyshyn 2002).
This presumption is further reinforced by the finding that all
participants in the control condition of Mast and Kosslyn’s
(2002) study reported that the fragmented pictures might
represent a human face. As such, the fragmented cues were
detailed enough to assign a semantic frame for further interpretation (i.e., face), thereby limiting the functional role that
visual imagery alone may have played in successful reinterpretation. Therefore, based on the available evidence in the
bistability detection paradigm, it is still an open question
whether reinterpretation can be achieved through imagery
processes alone, without assistance by visual cues.
In sum, two main issues should be resolved to validate
previous studies that have found reinterpretation in visual
imagery to be possible. First, it must be ensured that participants perceive only one interpretation by demonstrating
bistability after memorization of the test figures has taken
place. In studies with the most convincing evidence for
bistability detection in visual imagery (excluding Mast and
Kosslyn 2002), a bistability example was provided before
presenting the test figures (e.g., Brandimonte and Gerbino
1993; Hyman and Neisser 1991; Peterson et al. 1992). Second, bistability detection should be tested in a paradigm that
solicits a purely visual imagery process (i.e., without the
aid of visual cues). Next, a further conceptual extension of
previous research on reinterpretation is introduced.

Multimodal imagery: visual imagery and haptic cues
We have argued that previous research allows for the possibility that visual imagery might only be possible, or is at
least improved, because some direct visual information of
the bistable figure is available. In extension of this possibility, the present study investigates whether such direct sensory cues (cf. visual cues in Mast and Kosslyn 2002) can be
delivered through a non-visual modality as well; via haptic
inspection (i.e., manual touch) of the bistable figure during
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visual imagery. Assessing whether imagery makes use of
different sensory-systems dovetails with what Pearson and
Kosslyn (2015, p. 10,091) have suggested to be one of the
most pertinent questions today that has arisen out the aftermath of The Imagery Debate. Namely, “How many formats
can the brain use? For example, do we have separate formats
for motor, auditory, kinesthetic, and tactile information?”. If
haptic cues indeed readily inform visual imagery, it would
signal that mental imagery exploits multimodal information
(i.e., visual and haptic).
That the visual perception system and the haptic perception system provide commensurable information has been
found in a study by Held et al. (2011) who aimed to address
Molyneux’s problem. Philosopher William Molyneux
(1656–1698) posited a famous thought experiment: whether
someone who was born blind and regained sight later in
life would be able to visually recognize objects that were
touched, but never seen before (Morgan 1977). Held et al.
(2011) have negatively answered this question by showing
that newly sighted people failed to match objects (sphere
and cube) that they saw for the first time with what they
had previously only felt. Yet, continued testing showed that
people developed a multisensory awareness within a few
days, successfully linking what they had previously only felt
with what they were seeing. Thus, even though such sensorimotor knowledge is not present at birth, humans are naturally predisposed to actively discover meaningful invariances
between information across different senses. Such transfer of
information across the visual and haptic (i.e., touch) modalities has also been demonstrated in other studies (e.g., Wallraven, Bülthoff, Waterkamp, van Dam, & Gaißert, 2014; for
a review see Lederman and Klatzky 2009). For example,
when people are trained via touch to distinguish what category stimulus-objects belong to, they do not only show
improvement when tested on haptic categorization, but also
when tested on visual categorization (despite not having had
any visual training). This transfer of information works vice
versa, meaning that visual training also leads to improved
haptic performance (Wallraven et al. 2014).
Considering the findings on multimodality in visual
and haptic perception, it is not implausible that a similar
visual-haptic multimodality exists for mental imagery.
Indeed, studies on mental representations of hapticly perceived objects show considerable similarities with visual
imagery effects. For example, mental scanning times have
been shown to increase with spatial distance in both visual
imagery and haptic imagery (Kosslyn 1973; Röder and
Rösler 1998). The same holds true for mental rotation tasks
(Dellantonio and Spagnolo 1990; Prather and Sathian 2002;
Shepard and Metzler 1971). People take longer, both with
visual and haptic stimuli, to judge the similarity between two
objects depending on the angular disparity of those objects.
Additionally, overlapping brain activation in visual areas is
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found during mental imagery for both visually and hapticly
obtained information (De Volder et al. 2001). Given the ease
of transfer of information between the haptic and visual system as shown by the studies above, we would expect that
direct haptic cues of bistable figures during visual imagery
will increase successful reinterpretation (as compared to no
haptic cues). That concurrent haptic cues would interact with
visual imagery processing ability is further supported by
research indicating that haptic perception of pictorial 2-D
figures is readily achieved, but only when subjects are aware
of invariants that exist between haptic and visual-pictorial
stimuli (Lederman, Klatzky, Chataway, & Summers, 1990).
This is illustrated by congenitally blind subjects who do not
have any visual experiences with pictorial representations
and have much greater difficulties to interpret pictorial representations from haptic cues.

Present study
The current study assessed whether reinterpretation is possible without visual cues (cf. Mast and Kosslyn 2002) and
whether reinterpretation performance is improved by providing haptic cues. Notably, we used an example bistable
figure that has a reversal strategy that is similar to the test
figures (Peterson et al. 1992; cf.; Chambers and Reisberg
1985), and the participants were cued with this example of
a bistable figure after memorization of the test figures (cf.
Brandimonte and Gerbino 1993; Hyman and Neisser 1991;
Peterson et al. 1992). Participants memorized the figures
for 30 s.2 To assess the effect of haptic cues in detecting
bistability in visual imagery, participants could freely touch
the contours of, and rotate 2-D test figures by hand during visual imagery (Visual-Haptic condition), after having
memorized the figure visually (without touch). Furthermore,
we also included a Haptic Control condition, wherein participants hapticly explored one orientation of the test figure
during memorization and the alternate upside down orientation during reinterpretation. This condition was included to
control for the possibility that haptic cues were sufficient for
establishing reinterpretation of the figures (cf. comparable
to the control condition used by Mast and Kosslyn 2002).
If visually imagining figures with concurrent haptic cues
inflates successful reinterpretation relative to visual imagery

2
Note, that the chance that participants perceived bistability during
perception was predicted to be relatively low as the figure required
a reversal in the vertical plane (i.e., a rotation). For example, Mast &
Kosslyn (2002) showed that even when participants are given all the
time needed to memorize (and thus perceive) the old woman/young
lady figure, the greater majority did not perceive the alternate rotated
interpretation. This is to be contrasted with bistable figures, such as
the Necker cube, which can alternate perceptually within seconds
(e.g., Kornmeier and Bach 2005).
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without cues (Visual Only condition) and with haptic cues
only (Haptic Control condition), this would suggest that the
haptic system is able to work in concert with visual imagery.
This would be an important finding as it would suggest that
mental imagery does not operate on strictly “separate formats” for visual and tactile information (Pearson and Kosslyn 2015).

Method
Participants and design
Fifty-three participants were tested (36 female, Mage = 21.33
years, SDage = 2.32 years, range 18–29 years). All participants were students from the Erasmus University Rotterdam
who participated as part of a requirement of the Psychology
program or voluntarily. Recruitment targeted native Dutchspeaking students (N = 31) and non-native international students (N = 22). For non-native students a translated English
version of the Dutch instructions was used. All non-native
participants were proficient in English, as they were enrolled
in an international bachelor program instructed in English.
In addition, no problems of instruction were observed with
these participants during the experiment. This experiment
was designed and conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the ethical committee of the Department of Psychology, Education, and Child Studies, at the Erasmus University
Rotterdam.This study had a one-way within-subject design
with condition as three-level factor (Visual Only vs. Visual-Haptic vs. Haptic Control) and bistability detection (no
detection vs. detection) as main dependent variable. Each
condition was assigned one unique bistable figure, i.e., one
bistability detection trial per condition. Condition order, and
figure-condition assignment was counterbalanced.

Materials
Test figures and bistability example
Three different bistable test figures depicted in Fig. 2 were
designed based on the “Upside Down” campaign from Leo
Burnett (2015) retrieved from Google images.
These figures were the seal/doe, swan/elephant, and
penguin/giraffe. We selected these bistable test figures as
they were simple enough to memorize, but at the same
time also more complex to transform than other bistable
figures (e.g., duck/rabbit) potentially reducing the amount
of premature bistability detection during memorization.
We also wanted to use novel figures that were not used in
previous research as to make sure that participants (i.e.,
psychology students) were not already familiar with the
figures. A simplified version of the old woman/young lady
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The test figures were cut out of high-density foam sheets
and had clear sensible edges so that participants could
derive haptic sensory information from them.
Demographics and control questions
Upon completion of the experiment, participants filled out
a short questionnaire. Participants were asked for their age,
sex, and native language. Furthermore, to assess participants’ beliefs about the nature of the experiment they were
asked about the perceived purpose of the experiment “What
do you think was the purpose of the current study? (If you
have no idea, no answer is necessary)”, and expectations
“What do you think the researchers are expecting to discover
with the current study? (If you have no idea, no answer is
necessary)”.
Fig. 2  Test figures in body orientation (a) and head orientation (b).
from left to right: seal/doe, swan/elephant, and penguin/giraffe

(Howard, 1982) depicted in Fig. 1 was printed on an A4
size sheet of paper and used for the bistability example
phase (the test figures were presented as 2-D cutouts in
Fig. 2; thickness = 0.5 cm, length = ca. 16 cm, width = ca.
21 cm). Each of the figures (test figures and example figure) had two readily perceivable interpretations. An alternate interpretation could be seen by rotating the Fig. 180°
(i.e., upside down). In addition, the test figures of the animals shared a structural property, in that one interpretation
always showed the body of an animal while the upside
down interpretation showed the head of a different animal.

Fig. 3  Flowchart depicting procedure of the experiment. Note, that
order of condition and figure assigned to condition were counterbalanced. Orientation in which the figure was presented during the
memorization phase was randomized, as well as the first presented
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Recording equipment
Answers given by participants were documented by the
experimenter on a laptop computer. Performance was
recorded using a JVC Everio GZ-MG130 camcorder, to
ensure that data could be re-checked if necessary.

Procedure
Participants were tested individually and were told at onset
that they took part in a study about visual memory. The
experiment consisted of three sequential phases that were
conducted during a single test session. The three phases

orientation of the bistability example figure. In the testing phase,
eye symbols within clouds means visual imagery, and hand symbols
mean (concurrent) haptic perception
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consisted of a memorization phase, bistability example
phase, and a testing phase (see also Fig. 3).
Memorization phase
In the memorization phase three figures were presented
successively. In this memorization phase, participants were
explained that they will be presented with three different
figures and that they had to form an accurate mental image
of each of these figures because they would be tested on the
material later on. Each figure was inspected for 30 s. For
the Visual Only and Visual-Haptic condition, figures were
presented visually and for the Haptic Control condition the
figure was presented via manual touch only. In the Haptic
Control condition, participants could bimanually inspect the
cutout figure through two opening slots in a closed cardboard box. After each 30 s presentation of a figure, participants were asked what he/she had seen or felt (depending on
condition). The experimenter noted down what participants
detected in the figures. If participants reported perceiving
two or more distinct interpretations of a figure during the
memorization phase, the associated testing condition would
be skipped. It could also occur that participants would only
perceive the upside down interpretation of the figure (e.g.,
the figure was presented with the head orientation, but the
participant reported an upside down interpretation corresponding to the body orientation). This occurred in 23 of 159
instances, and we exclude these from our analyses as to base
our results on the most homogenous sample.3
Bistability example phase
After the memorization phase, participants were presented
with the bistability example figure of the old woman/young
lady (Fig. 1), with orientation of presentation randomized. It
was explained that this drawing was an example of a bistable
figure and contained two interpretations. Upon inspection,
they were asked what they saw in the drawing. After participants reported what they saw, they were asked whether
they could find the alternate interpretation in the drawing as
well. If participants reported that they could not discover the
bistability, they were instructed to turn the drawing upside
down and encouraged to look for the alternate interpretation

3
Notably, participants who reported an upside down interpretation
during memorization had already perceived and memorized the correct orientation of the alternate target interpretation. Therefore, these
participants did not have to rotate their mental image in the testing
phase to detect the alternate interpretation, despite adjusted instructions instructing them to do so. Since mental rotation ability likely
plays a key role in reinterpretation in our experiment, preserving
these participants could inflate successful reinterpretation rates (Mast
and Kosslyn 2002).
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again. If they were still unable to perceive the bistability,
the experimenter would point out the features of the alternate interpretation until they reported that they could see
it. When participants reported noticing the bistability, they
were asked to point out the features of both interpretations
so that the experimenter could verify whether they had actually perceived the bistability. It is important to note that this
bistability example of the old woman/young lady is structurally related to the testing figures in that they both have
two distinct interpretations that are orientation specific and
require the same upside down rotation reversal strategy. To
reiterate, this example procedure was employed to make sure
that participants were aware what visual bistability means,
so that they effectively seek a novel interpretation in the test
phase. Moreover, being familiar with visual bistability also
fosters visual reinterpretation in direct visual perception of
novel test figures (e.g., Mitroff et al. 2006).
Testing phase
Last, the testing phase was administered with the three different conditions. Participants were instructed to mentally
retrieve an image of one particular figure from the memorization phase (order of retrieval counterbalanced). Depending
on condition, participants retrieved the mental image either
through visual imagery alone (Visual Only condition), or
through visual imagery with haptic feedback by providing
the relevant cutout of the figure during visual imagery using
the cardboard box (Visual-Haptic condition), or through
haptic reinspection alone using the cardboard box (Haptic
Control condition). Once participants indicated that they
generated (or hapticly inspected) the mental image, the
experimenter would inform participants that this figure was
bistable. Participants in the Visual Only- and Visual-Haptic
condition were then instructed to “rotate their mental image
180 degrees upside down, just like the old woman/young
lady, in order to detect the alternate interpretation”. Participants in the Visual-Haptic condition were also told to
physically rotate the figure. In the Haptic Control condition,
participants were only told to physically rotate the figure to
detect bistability through haptic reinspection.
Participants were then asked three consecutive questions
in each of the three testing conditions. With each question,
more information was revealed by the experimenter regarding the correct interpretation (similar to Mast and Kosslyn
2002). First, participants were asked the open question if
they could detect the alternate interpretation in their rotated
mental image. If participants reported that they could not
detect the alternate interpretation, the experimenter would
continue with the next question. Second, participants were
given the category hint that the alternate interpretation was
an animal and were asked whether they could discover an
animal in their rotated mental image. The category hint
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would be skipped by the experimenter if participants already
reported an (incorrect) animal after the open question. Last,
participants were given a multiple choice selection of four
possible animal alternatives (see Table 3 in “Appendix” for
the selected choices per orientation for each figure). The
multiple choice question was always asked regardless of
whether participants already reported a correct interpretation or not. This provided participants the opportunity to
reconsider their answer when given a selection of possible
alternative interpretations.
For each question, participants were informed that they
would get as much time as they needed to provide an answer.
Although not central to our research question, the experimenter also recorded the time until the participant reported
an answer (Open 1st question, M = 42.21 s, SD = 29.43 s,
range = 6–172 s; 2nd Question, M = 10.08 s, SD = 19.80 s,
range = 0–123 s; 3rd question, M = 10.45 s, SD = 14.83 s,
range = 0–77 s), or that he/she was unable to discover the
alternate interpretation (Open 1st question, M = 83.11 s,
SD = 50.40 s, range = 0–238 s; 2nd Question, M = 35.72 s,
SD = 33.05 s, range = 0–103 s). During all three questions
(open question, category hint, and multiple choice) in all
three conditions, participants were instructed to keep their
eyes closed to prevent gaze-induced disruption or modulation in visual imagery (e.g., Buchanan et al. 2015; Markson
and Paterson 2009).
Concluding the experiment, participants were thanked for
their participation and asked to fill out a short questionnaire
containing the control questions. In cases where participants
detected a correct alternate interpretation in one or more of
the testing conditions, the experimenter would ask explicitly if he/she had noticed the alternate interpretation during
memorization or newly discovered it in visual imagery.

Performance and scoring
Performance was measured as a dichotomous-dependent
variable (correct vs. incorrect). An interpretation given by
a participant was considered correct in case this interpretation was also reported by another participant when visually
perceiving the figure in that orientation in the memorization
phase. For example, if a participant in our sample reported
having perceived a cow for the head orientation of the seal/
doe figure during the memorization phase, then this would
be considered a valid interpretation for all participants when
reported for that figure and orientation in the testing phase.
As such, participants served (primarily) as their own raters
in the current study, in contrast to more arbitrary post-hoc
experimenter judgments used in previous research (e.g.,
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Table 1  Performance for Each Question Type per Test Condition
Test condition
Visual only
Visual-haptic
Haptic control
Total average
scores

Open question Category hint

Multiple choice

11/36 (30.6%) 13/36 (36.1%) 22/36 (61.1%)
18/38 (47.4%) 16/38 (42.1%) 27/38 (71.1%)
14/43 (32.6%) 14/43 (32.6%) 30/43 (69.8%)
36.9%
36.9%
67.3%

Peterson et al. 1992). However, four other interpretations
were regarded as correct after a post-hoc agreement between
the first and second author that these were undeniably plausible visual interpretations for the given figure and its orientation (view Table 4 in “Appendix” for an overview of all
correct [post-hoc] interpretations). Note that these post-hoc
changes do not alter the interpretation of the results.

Results
Sample and data elimination per condition
A total of 42 out of 159 (3 × 53) instances of reinterpretation
per image (i.e., trials) were eliminated from these descriptive statistics (10/53 haptic control; 17/53 visual only; 15/53
visual-haptic). Of these trials 19 out of 42 were removed
because participants detected the bistability of the figure
prematurely (3/19 haptic control; 7/19 visual only; 9/19
visual-haptic) during the memorization phase (i.e., reported
two interpretations; one interpretation in the orientation presented, and another upside down interpretation corresponding to the 180 degree rotated orientation). The other 23 trials
(7/23 haptic control; 10/23 visual only; 6/23 visual-haptic)
were removed because they reported an interpretation during the memorization phase that corresponded to the upside
down orientation from the participant’s perspective.

Descriptives successful reinterpretation
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics showing the occurrence and rate of successful reinterpretations per condition.
The key dependent variable of interest here is the percentage of successful reinterpretations (i.e., participants who
provided a correct alternative interpretation) in the visual
imagery condition for the open question (i.e., asking to find
the alternate interpretation without any hints).
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Table 2  Performance for each
figure per question type and test
condition

Question type test condition
Open question
Visual only
Visual-haptic
Haptic control
Category hint
Visual only
Visual-haptic
Haptic control
Multiple choice
Visual imagery only
Visual-haptic
Haptic control

1245
Seal/Doe figure

Swan/elephant figure

Penguin/giraffe figure

2/11 (18.2%)
5/15 (33.3%)
2/14 (14.3%)

6/9 (66.7%)
8/11 (72.7%)
8/15 (53.3%)

3/16 (18.8%)
5/12 (41.7%)
4/14 (28.6%)

2/11 (18.2%)
5/15 (33.3%)
2/14 (14.3%)

4/9 (44.4%)
5/11 (45.5%)
8/15 (53.3%)

7/16 (43.8%)
6/12 (50.0%)
4/14 (28.6%)

5/11 (45.5%)
8/15 (53.3%)
7/14 (50.0%)

5/9 (55.6%)
10/11 (90.9%)
13/15 (86.7%)

11/16 (68.8%)
9/12 (75.0%)
10/14 (71.4%)

The percentage of detection rates are shown for each separate figure regardless of presented orientation in
the memorization/retrieval phase

Differences in performance between testing
conditions
Three confirmatory statistical tests were performed using a
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 0.0167 per test (0.05/3).
We hypothesized that haptic cues in the visual-haptic condition would lead to increased performance compared to the
visual only condition and the haptic control condition. We
compared the three test conditions (within-subjects) for the
open question, the category hint, and the multiple choice
question, with the key dependent variables of interest being
the amount of successful reinterpretation in each test condition for the open question. For the open question, performance was 30.6% reinterpretation (N = 25) in the visual only
condition, 47.4% reinterpretation (N = 25) in the Visualhaptic condition, and 32.6% reinterpretation (N = 25) in the
haptic control condition. A Cochran’s Q test was performed,
which tests differences in proportion for paired categorical
data with more than two groups. A Cochran’s Q test showed
that there was no statistically significant difference in successful reinterpretation between the different testing conditions, χ2(2) = 1.125, p = .570. Similarly, there were also no
significant differences in performance found between testing conditions for the category hint,χ2(2) = 1.412, p = .494,
nor for the multiple choice selection, χ2(2) = 2.471, p = .291.
Thus, regardless of test condition, participants showed no
improvement in performance for the open question, category
hint, and multiple choice selection.4

4
Note that we did not find statistically significant relationship
between native language (i.e., native, non-native) and reinterpretation
(open question) in visual imagery, χ2 (1, N = 36) = 1.89, p = .169). See
Appendix C for descriptives.

Differences in performance between figures
Using an alpha level of 0.05, we also looked at differences
in performance for the open question between the three figures, regardless of test condition. Performance for the open
question was 20% reinterpretation for the seal/doe figure,
68.6% reinterpretation for the swan/elephant figure, and
28.6% reinterpretation for the penguin/giraffe figure, regardless of test condition. A Cochran’s Q test revealed that there
was a statistically significant difference in performance
between the three testing figures, χ2(2) = 15.125, p < .001.
Pairwise comparisons using a Bonferroni correction of
p = .0167 (0.05/3) revealed no significant difference in performance for the seal/doe figure compared to the penguin/
giraffe figure, χ2(1) = 0.692, p = .405. However, a pairwise
comparison between the seal/doe figure and swan/elephant
figure revealed a significant difference in performance,
χ2(1) = 8.067, p = .005. In addition to this, a significant difference in performance was also found between the penguin/giraffe figure and swan/elephant figure, χ2(1) = 12.250,
p < .001. Table 2 shows the performance for each figure per
question type and test condition. We refer to the “Appendix” (Table 6) for a comprehensive table showing performance for both orientations of each figure (head and body
orientation) for each subsequent question in all three testing
conditions.

Discussion
The current study has two main findings. First, when controlling for premature bistability detection during memorization reinterpretation in visual imagery is possible without
visual cues. Eleven out of the 36 participants (30.6%), who
were not aware of bistability during memorization, reported
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a novel interpretation when imagining a bistable figure. This
is despite the fact that all these participants assigned a different interpretation (i.e., percept) to the figure during direct
visual inspection in the memorization phase.
It remains unclear whether providing haptic cues of a
bistable figure concurrent with visual imagery of that bistable figure improves successful reinterpretation (as opposed
to without haptic support). There was no statistically significant difference in the amount of successful reinterpretation for the visual-haptic condition when compared to the
visual only condition, or the haptic control condition. In the
next section, we will contextualize the current study, point
out some possible shortcomings, and finally conclude with
implications.

Reinterpretation in visual imagery is possible
without visual cues
Some previous studies have claimed that reinterpretation in
visual imagery is impossible (Chambers and Reisberg 1985;
Slezak 1991) whereas others provided evidence in favor of
successful reinterpretation. Importantly, the current study
replicates previous findings from studies that suggest bistability detection is possible, and distinguishes itself in several
ways from these previous studies (Brandimonte and Gerbino
1993; Finke et al. 1989; Hyman and Neisser 1991; Mast and
Kosslyn 2002; Peterson et al. 1992).
First, in the current study the bistability example was
shown after participants had visually memorized the test
figures. Therefore, participants were not led to expect
bistability in the test figures during direct visual or haptic
inspection in the memorization phase (cf. Brandimonte and
Gerbino 1993; Chambers and Reisberg 1985; Finke et al.
1989; Hyman and Neisser 1991; Peterson et al. 1992; Slezak
1991). Second, the current bistability example involved a
reversal strategy congruent with the test figures (180° rotation). This congruence ensures a sufficient understanding
of the reversal procedure. The current positive finding may,
therefore, contrast with studies that deemed reinterpretation
in visual imagery impossible, since these studies used exemplars that did not match reversal properties of the test figure
(as argued by Peterson et al. 1992). Last, the current study
expands on the findings by Mast and Kosslyn (2002), by
showing that reinterpretation in visual imagery is possible
without visual support. This is an important extension as
we can now exclude the possibility that direct visual input
during visual imagery is a necessary condition for successful
reinterpretation.

Shortcomings
Several possible shortcomings need to be addressed. First,
in a modest amount of trials (11.9%, 19 out of 159 trials)
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there was premature bistability detection during memorization. It is possible that some participants may have seen
bistability during memorization without having reported
this (otherwise they would have been excluded). However,
this is unlikely if we consider that we base the 30.6% successful reinterpretation rate in the Visual Only condition on
participants who did not report (either voluntarily or when
explicitly asked after the experiment) seeing bistability of
any of the figures during memorization. This strongly suggests that participants were successful in reinterpretation
through visual imagery.
Similar to previous research (e.g., Brandimonte and Gerbino 1993; Hyman and Neisser 1991; Mast and Kosslyn
2002), several participants detected both interpretations
(e.g., doe and seal are detected during memorization), or
the alternate interpretation was dominant (i.e., 26%). This
raises potential worries about the robustness of the findings. Is the proportion of participants that can reinterpret
an alternate interpretation in visual imagery (30.6% in the
visual only condition) based on a reliable estimate? We
think this is likely the case because previous studies have
obtained strikingly similar rates of reinterpretation (44% in
Mast and Kosslyn 2002; 35% for Exp. 1 in Peterson et al.
1992). Furthermore, we have recently gathered additional
data (see Pouw, Aslanidou, Kamermans, & Paas, 2017; Exp.
1 in Pouw, Fassi, Aslanidou, Kamermans, & Paas, under
review) which in a comparable condition yielded a reinterpretation rate of 20.6% despite the fact that these participants
did not receive an example figure of bistability (contrary
to the current study which used the old woman/young lady
to familiarize participants with bistable figures). Thus, the
current study confirms that the estimate of 30.6% detection
rate is credible, while excluding possible confounds of premature detection.
Another question that arises out of the current study is
why some participants perceive ambiguity during perception
while others do not. Unfortunately, the current study cannot
directly address this question about the perceptual dynamics
of ambiguity detection. However, there is a host of previous
research that has shown that both bottom-up and top-down
processes are at play in ambiguity detection (for a review
see Scocchia, Valsecchi, & Triesch, 2014). For example, it
has been shown that size of the figure can affect ambiguity
detection (Goolkasian 1991). Once perceived, subjects are
able to selectively maintain a percept through focus of attention (Meng and Tong 2004). Moreover, it has been found
that creativity measures can predict individual differences
in ambiguity detection (Doherty and Mair 2012). To conclude, there is a complex interplay between top-down and
bottom-up processes that need to be understood before we
can answer why there are individual differences in perception of ambiguity.
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It should further be noted that we have used a set of test
figures that have not been used in previous research. This
yielded unpredicted differences in detectability of bistability as indicated by the statistically significant difference in
detection rate for one particular figure. Namely, performance
was significantly higher for the swan/elephant in all three
conditions (see Table 2). However, this difference in detection rate does not alter the interpretation of the possibility of reinterpretation in visual imagery. Nor is this more
readily reinterpretable figure conflating (lack of) differences
between conditions, as figures were equally distributed over
conditions.
Based on previous research on multimodality, we
expected that haptic cues would support the quality of visual
imagery, and therefore, increase reinterpretation (Dellantonio and Spagnolo 1990; De Volder et al. 2001; Lacey, Campbell, & Sathian, 2007; Prather and Sathian 2002; Röder and
Rösler 1998). The confirmatory statistical analysis suggests
that this was not the case when tested within participants
who did not detect bistability in any of the three figures
during the memorization phase. Given these null-results,
we will refrain from interpreting this null-finding. Future
studies should ensure sample sizes that are large enough
to cope with considerable losses in data that are caused by
issues inherent to bistable test figures used in studies on
reinterpretation in visual imagery.
We have, however, gathered additional data regarding
the possible supportive role of the haptic system in mental imagery (Pouw et al. 2017; Exp. 1 in Pouw et al. under
review; preprint [and data] available at https://osf.io/ct4m3/).
In this recent study, subjects had to manually explore the
visually ambiguous 2-D figures during memorization, without visual perception (similar to our control condition in the
present study). First, in the first experiment it was found that
a small portion of the subjects that reinterpreted the memorized figures in mental imagery produced gestures (without
speech) as if manually exploring the figure. We interpret this
finding as an indication that the haptic system may indeed
support mental imagery performance. In a follow-up experiment, we obtained that subjects who had to perform a secondary motor task during the reinterpretation of previously
memorized figures (drumming their fingers on the table)
underperform compared to subjects who do not move, or
produce manual movements that follow the contours of the
imagined figures. These results are a promising indication
pointing toward a functional role of haptic cues in visual
imagery processes.
Finally, note that the current study does not provide
insight on why participants are (not) able to detect bistability in visual imagery. For example, performance in the
present study might be associated with mental rotation abilities (Mast and Kosslyn 2002). Mast and Kosslyn (2002)
presented the old woman/young lady as their test figure and
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found that successful reinterpretation in visual imagery was
related to participants’ mental rotation ability. Similarly, our
test figures also required an upside down rotation to orient the alternate interpretation. These similarities strongly
suggest that mental rotation abilities have played a crucial
role in which participants in our sample successfully reinterpreted the figure in imagery. Future research should be
especially dedicated in further gauging factors that predict
individual differences in reinterpretation performance. However, it may also be possible that differences occur later on
in the reinterpretation process. Namely, it is possible that
participants were able to retain and successfully rotate the
image in visual imagery, but still failed to reinterpret the
image because the initial percept (e.g., penguin) is simply
too dominant (Chambers and Reisberg 1991). In such a case,
participants rotate the original percept and cannot shift their
understanding of the image beyond their original percept
that now appears upside down (e.g., upside down penguin).
As such, further research could focus on individual capacities to ascertain why some and not others are able to reinterpret their visual image, and where such differences occur
in the reinterpretation process.
One could wonder if reinterpretation would have occurred
in our sample if participants did not receive the instruction
to rotate their mental image upside down. In fact, Hyman
and Neisser (1991) found that the success of reinterpretation
in imagery depends on specificity of the instructions. Their
results showed that performance improved significantly
depending on how much information was concealed within
the instructions—similar to how performance in our sample
generally increased with each subsequent question. Therefore, future studies could investigate boundary conditions of
ambiguity detection depending on instructions.

Conclusion
The current results validate previous research and replicates its findings by showing that (a) visual images do not
necessarily function as descriptions, and (b) can be used to
accomplish similar cognitive acts as with pictorial representations, and (c) bistability detection in visual imagery is
difficult (as evidenced by low detection rates). If imagery
were to function as descriptions, visual images brought forth
from memory do not preserve raw spatial properties of the
original source (e.g., duck), rather such spatial properties are
encoded under a mode of presentation that is fixed, preventing reinterpretation by an imaginer. Inversely, the current
results validate previous research according to which mental
images preserve spatial information of an object remembered, and showing that reinterpretations do not need the
presence of visual cues.
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Appendix
See Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6.

Elephant/swan

Doe/seal

Giraffe/penguin

(A) Elephant–swan
(B) Butterfly–eagle
(C) Jellyfish–dinosaur
(D) Flamingo–rhino

(A) Pigeon–squid
(B) Turtle–parrot
(C) Doe–seal
(D)Rabbit–frog

(A) Crocodile–bear
(B) Ostrich–owl
(C) Monkey–otter
(D) Giraffe–penguin

Alternatives in bold are correct answers

Table 4  Correct interpretations
based on visually perceived
figures during memorization
phase

Orientation

Seal/doe

Swan/elephant

Penguin/giraffe

Body orientation

Seal/walrus*

Penguin

Head orientation

Doe/deer/goat/cow/sheep/
giraffe/calf/foal/pig

Swan/bird/ostrich/goose/
peacock*
Elephant/umbrella

Giraffe/bull/cow/
deer/ goat*/
buck*

Interpretations with asterisk were added post-hoc and based on the judgment of the experimenters

Table 5  Performance for
natives and non-natives per test
condition
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Test condition
Visual only
Visual-haptic
Haptic control

Native
8/20 (40%)
8/19 (42.1%)
10/24 (41.7%)

Non-native
3/16 (18.8%)
10/19 (52.6%)
4/19 (21.1%)

Psychological Research (2019) 83:1237–1250
Table 6  Performance for both
orientations of each figure per
test condition and question type

Test condition question type
Visual only
Open question
Category hint
Multiple choice
Visual-haptic
Open question
Category hint
Multiple choice
Haptic control
Open question
Category hint
Multiple choice
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